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Rational, value-based decision-making mandates selecting the option with highest
subjective expected value after appropriate deliberation. We examined activity in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and striatum of monkeys deciding between smaller,
immediate rewards and larger, delayed ones. We previously found neurons that modulated
their activity in this task according to the animal’s choice, while it deliberated (choice
neurons). Here we found neurons whose spiking activities were predictive of the spatial
location of the selected target (spatial-bias neurons) or the size of the chosen reward
(reward-bias neurons) before the onset of the cue presenting the decision-alternatives,
and thus before rational deliberation could begin. Their predictive power increased as the
values the animals associated with the two decision alternatives became more similar.
The ventral striatum (VS) preferentially contained spatial-bias neurons; the caudate nucleus
(CD) preferentially contained choice neurons. In contrast, the DLPFC contained significant
numbers of all three neuron types, but choice neurons were not preferentially also bias
neurons of either kind there, nor were spatial-bias neurons preferentially also choice
neurons, and vice versa. We suggest a simple winner-take-all (WTA) circuit model to
account for the dissociation of choice and bias neurons. The model reproduced our results
and made additional predictions that were borne out empirically. Our data are compatible
with the hypothesis that the DLPFC and striatum harbor dissociated neural populations
that represent choices and predeliberation biases that are combined after cue onset; the
bias neurons have a weaker effect on the ultimate decision than the choice neurons, so
their influence is progressively apparent for trials where the values associated with the
decision alternatives are increasingly similar.
Keywords: pre-deliberation decision bias, value-based decision-making, decision circuit-modeling, free-choice
decision making, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ventral striatum, caudate nucleus, monkey single-neuron
recording
INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing debate on the proper interpretations of
brain signals that predict upcoming free decisions before subjects
report having decided. In such free decisions the choice is up to
the subject and there is no right or wrong answer (Libet et al.,
1983; Libet, 1985). Recent results suggest that motor intentions
can be decoded in these cases from neural activity up to about
a second before action onset using EEG (Haggard and Eimer,
1999; Bai et al., 2011) or single-neuron activity in humans (Fried
et al., 2011) and up to several seconds before onset, at about 60%
accuracy, using functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI;
Soon et al., 2008; Bode et al., 2011). It was also demonstrated
that more-abstract decisions (such as adding or subtracting two
small numbers) could be decoded before the decision alterna-
tives became available (Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2013).
Interestingly, models of these experimental results focus on the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as the locus of intentional
action selection (Pockett, 2006; Pacherie and Haggard, 2011).
However, the choices in the above experiments were generally
between randomly raising the left or right hand, with no conse-
quences and for no reason or purpose (although early, predictive
local-field potentials may also exist for deliberate decisionmaking
that relies on rational deliberation; Maoz et al., 2012). So, impor-
tantly, it is not clear to what extent these early predictive signals
are part of the neural process involved in deliberate decisions. An
alternative hypothesis is that in the absence of reasons to prefer
one option over the other, the decision network may also rely on
activity that occurs before the decision options are known and
rational deliberation can begin. Such slow background fluctua-
tions, for example, could be used to break the symmetry and bias
the decision toward one of the equally valued alternative (Haynes,
2011). In contrast, for divergently valued alternatives, the prede-
liberation fluctuations that occur before rational deliberation can
begin are generally not strong enough to influence the outcome,
so they would have little predictive power over the decisions. An
empirical prediction of this predeliberation-biases hypothesis is,
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therefore, that outcomes of decisions between similarly valued
options could be, to some extent, predicted from brain activity
occurring before the subject knows what the decision alternatives
will be.
Neuronal activity before the presentation of the decision alter-
natives that is predictive of the eventual choice has been shown
before, including in prefrontal cortex and the caudate nucleus
(CD). But this was in situations where the decision alternatives
associated with maximal reward were stable across multiple tri-
als, and the optimal choice could thus be computed before the
decision alternatives were revealed (Coe et al., 2002; Lauwereyns
et al., 2002; Ding and Hikosaka, 2006). Perceptual judgments
were also shown to partially depend on ongoing neural activity
prior to the onset of the sensory stimuli (Sadaghiani et al., 2010),
including in CD—but were not found in the DLPFC (Kim and
Shadlen, 1999; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001;Williams et al., 2003;
Ding and Gold, 2010). Moreover, an integrate-and-fire attractor
model of decisions based on random spontaneous firing sug-
gested that decisions can be predicted before cue onset from
ongoing noise (Rolls and Deco, 2011). However, little is known
about the neural correlates of biases during value-based decision-
making, where computation of the optimal decision cannot begin
before the decision alternatives are presented. In this type of deci-
sions subjects’ choices are freely based on the subjective values
they associate with the decision alternatives (Rangel et al., 2008),
and it is difficult to define correct and incorrect responses.
A common example of conflict among value-based decision
options is intertemporal choice between a small, immediate
reward and a larger, delayed one (Frederick et al., 2002). Previous
studies found that the activity of individual neurons in the
DLPFC, parietal cortex, and basal ganglia (BG) encode the subjec-
tive value of a delayed reward, namely, the magnitude of reward
discounted by its delay (Kim et al., 2008; Louie and Glimcher,
2010; Cai et al., 2011). But how such temporally discounted values
are used for decision making in the brain is not well understood.
The prefrontal cortex, including DLPFC, has been implicated in
multiple aspects of decision making in both humans and non-
human primates (Rangel et al., 2008;Wallis and Kennerley, 2010),
such as coding subjective values for alternative options or coding
the option chosen by the animal (Barraclough et al., 2004; Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Kennerley et al., 2009). Previous
neuroimaging, lesion, and stimulation studies also highlighted
the role of BG and cortico-BG communication in regulating deci-
sions involving temporal delays (Kable and Glimcher, 2007, 2010;
Luhmann et al., 2008; Pine et al., 2009; Cavanagh et al., 2011).
Following the above, we therefore focused here on an intertem-
poral choice in value-based decision-making to empirically test
a prediction of the predeliberation-biases hypothesis above.
Namely, we wanted to investigate the extent to which neural infor-
mation that was represented in the DLPFC, ventral striatum (VS)
and CD before cue onset—hereafter bias activity—influenced
later decisions. We also wanted to know whether there was vari-
ability in bias-activity representation across brain regions. We
were further interested in how bias activity differs, if at all, from
value-related information that appeared after cue onset during
deliberation—hereafter choice activity—and how the two are inte-
grated. Our working hypothesis was that the bias activity was
dissociated from the choice activity, and had a weaker influence
on the ultimate decision than that choice activity, so that its effect
was mainly apparent when the values of the decision alternatives
were similar.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
ANIMAL PREPARATION
All data analyzed in this study were from three male rhesus mon-
keys (D and J for DLPFC, H and again J for BG). Behavioral and
neurophysiological data were collected as previously described
(Kim et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2011). All procedures used in the
present study were approved by the Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committee at Yale University and TheUniversity of Rochester
Committee on Animal Research, and conformed to the PHS Policy
on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and the Guide for
the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals.
BEHAVIORAL TASK
The animals performed an intertemporal choice and a control
task. During each trial of the intertemporal choice task, the ani-
mal fixated a small white square that appeared at the center of
the screen during a 1 s fore period (Figure 1A). Two peripheral
targets were next presented along the horizontal meridian during
the 1 s cue period. The central square was then extinguished—the
go signal—and the animal was required to shift its gaze toward
one of the two targets. Choosing the red target resulted in a large
reward (0.4ml of apple juice), while the green target delivered a
smaller reward (0.26ml). Target positions were randomized and
counterbalanced across trials. Each target appeared either by itself
or surrounded by a clock consisting of 2, 4, 6, or 8 yellow dots.
This corresponded to no delay or to 2, 4, 6, or 8 s delay before
reward delivery, respectively. Once the animal fixated its chosen
target, the other target disappeared, and the clock surrounding
the chosen target began counting down the dots at a rate of 1/s
(Figure 1A). The animal was rewarded when the last yellow dot
disappeared. The screen then went blank for a 2 s inter-trial inter-
val. When the animal chose the target with the shorter delay, the
inter-trial interval was increased by the difference between the
longer and shorter delay, so that the onset of the next trial was
not influenced by the animal’s choice (Figure 1A). The delay asso-
ciated with the small-reward target was 0 or 2 s long, and that
associated with the large-reward was 0, 2, 4, 6, or 8 s. For the
striatum data all 10 possible delay pairs were used, while for the
DLPFC the combination of 2 s delay for the small reward and
0 s delay for the large reward was not used. Each combination
was presented twice (four times) in a block of DLPFC (striatum)
intertemporal choice trials with the target positions counterbal-
anced; 18 (40) trials per block in experiments in the DLPFC
(striatum).
The control task was identical to the intertemporal choice task,
except for two changes. First, the central fixation square was either
green or red, which informed the animal of the target it was
required to select. Incorrect trials were not rewarded. Second, the
reward amount was fixed (at 0.13ml) and awarded with no delay.
Blocks of intertemporal choice and control trials were presented
alternately. The experiment was set up so that each session would
consist of the same number of trials in the intertemporal choice
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FIGURE 1 | Task and behavior. (A) Three animals (two in the DLPFC
experiment and one of the two and another in the basal-ganglia experiment)
indicated their preference between a smaller and more immediate juice
reward (designated by the green target) and a larger, but generally delayed
one (red target). The number of yellow dots surrounding the targets—the
clock—indicated the delay in seconds associated with each target. Portrayed
are the full timelines and screenshots of two trials and the beginning of a
third trial. Each trial is made up of a 1 s fore period, followed by a 1 s cue
period, and afterwards a go signal leading to target fixation. Then, after the
delay associated with the chosen target is counted down, the reward is
delivered. And, after an inter-trial interval of 2 s, the next trial starts. If the
animal chooses the target with the shorter delay, the difference between the
longer and shorter delay is added to the inter-trial interval, so as not to
motivate the animal to select the target with the shorter delay to bring about
the next trial more quickly. The first trial depicts a choice between a 2 s-delay
small reward and 8 s-delay large one, where the animal selects the large
reward. In the second trial, the animal opts for an immediate small reward
over a 2 s-delayed large reward. The interval between two ticks on the time
scale is 1 s. The 1.5 s pre-cue period is denoted in light blue. (B) The mean
probability (±SEM) of choosing the small reward vs. the 9 possible
combinations of delays (N = 62 sessions) from both animals in the DLPFC,
including the UNDET, WDET, and SDET probability ranges.
and control tasks. Of the 164 DLPFC neurons, 135 were tested in
10 blocks for each condition (360 trials) and the rest were tested
for at least six blocks for each condition (216 trials). Of the 183
striatal neurons (93 CD, 90VS), 181 were tested over at least three
blocks (120 trials) and on average more than four blocks were
tested per neuron (167.4 ± 3.7 and 162.4 ± 4.1 trials for CD and
VS, respectively).
When the animal broke fixation before the go signal, the trial
was restarted with the same rewards and delays. If fixation was
broken after cue onset (in 4855 of overall 36738, 13%, and in 369
trials of overall 34052 trials, 1%, for DLPFC and striatal record-
ings, respectively), the animal could have gained information
about the decision option it was about to face in the upcoming
restarted trial. Trials that immediately followed those where fixa-
tion breaking occurred after cue onset were therefore not included
in the analysis. This, together with the randomization of the small
and large reward positions and their associated delays for the
intertemporal choice and control blocks, meant that during the
pre-cue period analyzed in the present study, the animal would
know neither the positions nor the delay of the targets about to
appear. Therefore, in our task, cue onset is also when rational
deliberation can begin. Our data is taken from Experiment I of
Kim et al. (2008) and from Cai et al. (2011), where more details
can be found.
ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL DATA—PARTITIONING THE TRIALS INTO
FOUR TYPES
Following our working hypothesis, we expected the bias activ-
ity to increasingly influence the animals’ decisions when the
subjective values that the animals associated with the decision
alternatives became more similar—i.e., when the temporally dis-
counted reward magnitudes associated with the two targets were
comparable for the animal. In other words, the less the decision
was determined by the cue information, the more we expected
it to be predictable from the bias activity. So we divided the
experimental trials into four types according to the apparent
similarity of the values of the decision alternatives. The fre-
quency with which the animals chooses a particular target over
its alternative within every pair of reward/delay combinations is
a well-established estimate of the subjective value of that option
(Sugrue et al., 2004). We therefore used it here too. More specifi-
cally, the animals increasingly discounted the value of the reward
as a function of the reward’s delay (Figure 1B) (Kim et al.,
2008; Hwang et al., 2009). For each recording session, there
were 9 or 10 possible short/long delay pairs (see above), each
associated with the ratio of trials in which the animal chose
the small reward to the overall number of trials (Figures 1B,
Figure S1). The four trial types were: The undetermined trials
[where the probability of selecting the small reward was in the
range (0.35, 0.65)]—denoted UNDET—that had the most sim-
ilar discounted values for the two targets, making the decision
largely undetermined by the visual cues. The weakly determined
trials [choice ratio range (0.25,0.35) or (0.65,0.75)]—WDET—
that had the discounted values for the two targets farther apart.
The strongly determined trials [ratio in (0,0.25) or (0.75,1)]—
denoted SDET—that had the most divergent discounted values.
Lastly, no choice trials—NC—included all trials in the control
experiment, where the animal was instructed which target to
fixate.
ANALYSIS OF NEURAL DATA
Overall, 164 DLPFC neurons were recorded (77 from animal D,
87 from J), 90VS neurons (33 from H, 57 from J), and 93 CD
neurons (32 from H, 61 from J). Great care was taken to insure
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that all spikes originated from single neurons. To determine bias
neurons we looked at spiking activity 1.5 s before cue onset in
all analyses—henceforth the pre-cue period. This time frame was
comprised of the last 0.5 s of the inter-trial interval and the 1 s fore
period (Figure 1A). We included only the last half-second of the
inter-trial interval because we did not want activity from the pre-
vious trial, which might linger in the beginning of the inter-trial
interval, to confound our results.
In addition, only neurons that satisfied three criteria were
included in this study. First, they were recorded during sessions
containing at least one UNDET-type reward-delay combination
(which on average± SEM consisted of 32 ± 3, 23 ± 3, and 30 ± 6
trials for the DLPFC spatial-bias, DLPFC reward-bias, and VS
spatial-bias, respectively). Second, the mean firing rate of the
neurons 1.5 s before cue onset was at least 0.5 spikes/s. Third,
the animal did not display a very strong behavioral spatial pref-
erence toward the left or the right—i.e., it had to choose the
left and right target at least 25% of the trials. Importantly, any
deviations from an even left/right split are specifically taken into
account by our method for identifying bias neurons and by
the proportion explained measure (see below). When analyz-
ing the DLPFC data for spatial biases, 105 of the 164 neurons
(64%) met all three criteria and were subjected to further anal-
yses (44 from animal D). In the analysis of reward biases, the
third criterion was not imposed because it is dissociated from
a choice based on reward size. Hence, for the reward-size anal-
ysis, 118 of the 164 neurons (72%) were subjected to further
analysis (53 from animal D). For VS, 52 and 56 of the 90
neurons (58 and 62%) were included in the spatial-bias and
reward-bias analyses (38 and 40 from J), respectively. For CD,
54 and 60 of the 93 neurons (58 and 65%) were included in the
spatial-bias analysis and reward-bias analyses (43 and 44 from J),
respectively.
The 105 DLPFC neurons used in the spatial-bias analysis were
recorded over 62 sessions. Given our neuron inclusion criteria,
there was at least one UNDET-type reward/delay combination in
each session, but only 30 of the 62 sessions (48%) also contained
WDET-type trials. The 118 DLPFC neurons used in the reward-
bias analysis were recorded over 69 sessions. WDET-type trials
appeared in 35 of those 69 sessions (51%). The 52VS neurons
were recorded over 51 sessions, 34 of which (65%) also contained
WDET-type trials. The VS did not contain more reward-bias neu-
rons than expected by chance and the CD did not contain more
spatial- or reward-bias neurons than expected by chance (Table
S1). So those breakdowns are not included here.
For each of the participating neurons, we counted the num-
ber of spikes in the 1.5 s before cue onset—during the last 0.5 s of
the inter-trial interval and the entire 1 s fore period (Figure 1A)—
for every participating trial. Spike bursts—action potentials fired
less than 10ms apart—were consolidated into a single spike (Bair
et al., 1994) (omitting this step did not affect any of our main
result). We also computed a spike density function (SDF) for
each spike train by convolving it with a 100ms Gaussian window
(Figures 2–4), which was used for plotting purposes only.
FIGURE 2 | Three examples of DLPFC spatial-bias neurons and one
non-bias neuron. Raster plots (top; ranked by increasing trial number
for trials with subsequent leftward and rightward eye movements
separately), spike-density function plots (mean ± SEM; middle), and
logistic-regression best-fits (bottom) to the data of 4 DLPFC neurons
(Panels A and D from Animal D, B and C from J). Cue onset is at 0 s,
so depicted is spiking activity from the last half-second of the inter-trial
interval as well as from the 1 s fore period. The data is taken from all
the undetermined (UNDET) trials of each neuron, because bias neurons
were selected using only UNDET trials. Panels (A–C) depict spatial bias
neurons, while panel (D) is a non-bias neuron. The number of trials
associated with each data point in the logistic regression is designated
by the diameter of the symbol. (See Figure S2A for ROC and
choice-probability analyses of these neurons.).
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FIGURE 3 | Two examples of DLPFC reward-bias neurons. Raster plots,
spike-density function plots (mean ± SEM), and logistic-regression best-fits
to the data of 2 DLPFC reward-bias neurons from all their UNDET trials
(Panels A and B from Animal D and J, respectively). Details are given in
Figure 2. (See Figure S2B for ROC and choice-probability analyses of these
neurons.).
Computing prediction accuracy, proportion explained, and bias
neurons
Counting the number of spikes during the 1.5 s prior to cue onset
in each trial, we calculated the ratio of trials culminating in right-
ward saccades or high-reward choices to overall trials for each
unique number of spikes (Figures 2–4). Analyzing each neuron
separately, we then used binomial logistic-regression in a leave-
one-out cross-validation procedure—training the model on all
but one trial and testing it on the remaining, statistically indepen-
dent trial—to predict rightwards saccades or large-reward choice
for the remaining test-set trial. We labeled left (low-reward) as
0 and right (high-reward) as 1, and predicted a leftward (low-
reward) choice for a trial if the predicted probability from the
logistic regression was <0.5 and rightward (high-reward) other-
wise (a log-likelihood-ratios analysis of the predicted probabilities
suggested that 0.5 was the optimal threshold to use for our data).
The prediction accuracy for each neuron was defined as the ratio
of correctly predicted trials to overall trials.
For the spatial-bias analysis, the numbers of left and right
choices for each neuron were not generally similar (Figures 2–4),
while the number of high- and low-reward choices for each neu-
ron tended to be more similar. Therefore, chance-level prediction
varied among the neurons according to the behavioral preference
of the animal, and we computed it using bootstrap resampling of
the original data. For each neuron we randomly shuffled the left
and right labels or high- and low-reward labels among the tri-
als and computed the prediction accuracy with the same logistic
FIGURE 4 | Two examples of VS spatial-bias neurons. Raster plots,
spike-density function plots (mean ± SEM), and logistic-regression best-fits
to the data of 2 VS reward-bias neurons from all their UNDET trials (Panels
A and B from Animal H and J, respectively). Details are given in Figure 2.
(See Figure S2C for ROC and choice-probability analyses of these neurons.).
regression method. We repeated this procedure 10,000 times to
create an expected distribution of chance prediction-accuracy
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). The mean of this chance distribu-
tion was designated the chance-level prediction-accuracy for this
neuron.
We computed the proportion of the variance that remained
unexplained above chance level and was explained by the activity
of the neuron—termed proportion explained—for all trial types.
More specifically, designating the prediction accuracy by ai and
chance level by ci for neuron i, we calculated (ai − ci)/(1 − ci),
where the denominator, (1 − ci), is the variance left unexplained
by the chance level. For example, in a session where the monkey
saccaded to the left 65% of the time, a neuron predicting 75%
of the trials correctly would have a proportion explained value
of (0.75-0.65)/(1-0.65) = 0.29. Neurons for which the prediction
accuracy was smaller than chance (ai < ci) therefore had neg-
ative proportion explained. We used this proportion explained
as the basic measure of accuracy in our data for plotting pur-
poses (Figures 5A–C, 8), though not for finding bias neurons (see
below). We also then calculated in which percentile of the chance-
level distribution lay the prediction accuracy, and for how many
neurons the prediction accuracy lay in the top 50-percentile of
their chance-level distribution (Figure 6).
We sought neurons whose pre-cue activity—i.e., activity
before the decision alternatives were revealed—was significantly
predictive of the animal’s choice after cue onset. To accom-
plish this, we focused on UNDET trials and tested for each
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FIGURE 5 | Accuracy vs. chance level and proportion explained above
chance level for DLPFC spatial- and reward-bias neurons and VS
spatial-bias neurons. (A–C) Scatter plots of accuracy vs. chance level are
depicted for UNDET trials. Bias neurons and anti-bias neurons (see
Figure 6) are designated in red and cyan squares, respectively. (D)
Average (±SEM) proportion explained above chance level over DLPFC
spatial-bias neurons during UNDET, weakly determined (WDET), strongly
determined (SDET), and no-choice control (NC) trials. The proportions
explained for UNDET (0.16 ± 0.03; ±SEM) and WDET (0.03 ± 0.01) are
significantly greater than expected by chance, while those at SDET
(0.01 ± 0.01) and NC (−0.005 ± 0.004) are at chance (paired one-tailed
t-test, p = 2·10−5, p = 0.01, p = 0.09, and p = 0.9, respectively). In
addition, the slope of the regression line through the four trial types was
significantly positive (p < 2·10−8). (E) Average (±SEM) proportion explained
above chance level over DLPFC reward-bias neurons during UNDET, SDET
NC trials. The proportion explained for UNDET (0.37 ± 0.04) was
significantly greater than expected by chance while the SDET (0.03 ± 0.03)
an NC (0.02 ± 0.01) ones were not (paired one-tailed t-test, p = 2·10−6,
p = 0.17, and p = 0.06, respectively). The slope of the regression line
through the data was also significantly positive (p < 4·10−7). WDET trials
were not included because there were too few trials—only 5 of 12—for
meaningful statistical analysis. (F) Average (±SEM) proportion explained
above chance level over VS spatial-bias neurons during UNDET, SDET, and
NC trials. The proportion explained for UNDET (0.17 ± 0.03) was
significantly greater than expected by chance, while the SDET
(−0.004 ± 0.01) and NC (−0.02 ± 0.01) values were not (paired one-tailed
t-test, p = 8·10−5, p = 0.65, and p = 0.9, respectively). The slope of the
regression line through the data was also significantly positive
(p < 1·10−6). WDET trials were not included because there were too few
trials—only 9 of 14—for meaningful statistical analysis. P-values in the
figure are for one-tailed t-tests. (See Figure 6 for histograms of the
percentiles of the prediction accuracies in the chance-level distributions.).
FIGURE 6 | Histograms of percentiles of prediction accuracies in the
distributions of chance level over the entire neuron populations. For
each neuron in the population we calculated its prediction accuracy, and
then by repeatedly and randomly shuffling its left/right or large-/small-reward
labels also its chance-level distribution. We then computed in which
percentile of its chance-level distribution the neuron’s prediction accuracy
lay. A histogram of these percentiles over all neurons is plotted here.
Neurons at the top/bottom 5-percentile are designated bias/anti-bias
neurons, respectively. (A) The mean percentile of all neurons involved in
DLPFC spatial-bias analysis (n = 105) is 66% (green dotted line), and is
significantly greater than chance-distribution mean (at 50%, black dotted
line; Wilcoxon test p = 2·10−7). Also, 69 of the 105 DLPFC neurons are in
the top 50-percentile of the chance-distribution mean, which is significantly
more than expected by chance (binomial test p = 8·10−4). (B) The mean
percentile of all neurons involved in DLPFC reward-bias analysis (n = 118) is
57% and significantly greater than the chance-distribution mean (Wilcoxon
test p = 0.01); 70 of 118 neurons are in the top 50-percentile, significantly
more than expected by chance (binomial test p = 0.026). (C) The mean
percentile of all neurons involved in VS spatial-bias analysis (n = 52) is
63% and significantly greater than chance-distribution mean (Wilcoxon test
p = 0.004); 33 of 52 neurons are in the top 50-percentile, significantly
more than would be expected by chance (binomial test p = 0.035).
neuron whether its pre-cue prediction accuracy was significantly
above chance at p = 0.05. Therefore, for each neuron we tested
whether its UNDET prediction accuracy was among the top
5% of the 10,000 UNDET chance-level values calculated in the
bootstrapping procedure above, for the spatial-bias and reward-
bias analyses (Figure 6). Neurons that passed this test were des-
ignated bias neurons and their spiking activity was termed bias
activity. We tested this bias activity over the pre-cue, cue, and go
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periods. The go period is defined as the first 500ms after the onset
of the go signal (Figure 1). Similarly, neurons whose UNDET pre-
diction accuracy was among the bottom 5% of chance values (0
of 105, 0%, 5 of 118, 4%, and 1 of 52, 2%, for DLPFC spatial-bias,
DLPFC reward-bias, and VS spatial-bias analyses, respectively;
all within the proportions expected by chance; Figures 5A–C, 6)
were designated anti-bias neurons.
Error-trials and standardized firing-rate analysis
Trials where both rewards were offered with no delay yet the
monkey selected the small immediate reward over the large
immediate reward occurred rarely (3% of trials with immediate
rewards), and were designated error trials. We wanted to under-
stand whether the firing rate of bias neurons for trials in which
their preferred direction aligned with the target associated with
the smaller reward was higher than over the rest of the trials,
which might suggest that the bias activity contributes to com-
mitting the error. We therefore searched for such trials recorded
for bias neurons and found 24 trials distributed over 7 of the
29 DLPFC spatial-bias neurons, but no trials involving striatal
spatial-bias neurons. In order to combine the firing rate across tri-
als from different neurons with different baseline firing rates, we
standardized the firing rates by transforming them into z-values
(i.e., for each neuron separately, we subtracted the mean from
each firing rate and divided by the standard deviation).
CIRCUIT MODEL AND SIMULATIONS
Two neural network circuits were constructed to capture the
essential aspects of the neural dynamics of decision-making. The
first is a simpler circuit encompassing only spatial bias activity
(Figure 9A). The second is full model that includes both spatial
and reward-bias activities (Figure S3A), and is described below.
The simpler circuit is composed of 5 mean-rate units, modeled
as non-saturating half-wave rectified units of the form f (x) =
max (x − T, 0), where T = 1 is a constant activation thresh-
old. Each unit represents the average firing rate of a network
of biological spiking neurons (Wong and Wang, 2006). Three
of these units (xL, xR, and h) form a simple winner-take-all
(WTA) network. The other two units bias the activity of the WTA
dynamics. The network reaches a decision through competition
between excitatory units xL and xR,—which stand for left and
right choice, respectively, and model the population of choice
neurons. The choice units are recurrently excitatory (with weight
α = 1.5) and mutually inhibitory through a shared inhibitory
unit h (the connections to/from h have the weight β1 = 3/β2 =
0.4, respectively). This WTA circuit thus suppresses/amplifies the
weaker/stronger external input I, respectively (Douglas et al.,
1995). After convergence only xL or xR remain active. The two
inputs, IL and IR, represent the temporally discounted values of
the sensory evidence for choosing either the left or right tar-
get, respectively. Without any bias activity, the unit receiving the
highest discounted value will win (Figure 9B) and determine the
direction of the animal’s saccade (e.g., through projections of xL
and xR downstream to motor areas like the frontal eye field or
superior colliculus) (Lo and Wang, 2006).
To model the population of spatial bias neurons, we added
excitatory bias units, pL and pR (implemented as pointer
neurons; Hahnloser et al., 1999), which were bi-directionally
connected to xL and xR, respectively (with weight δ = 0.1).
The dynamics of the choice units are modeled as τx˙i + Gxi =
f
(
Ii + αxi + δpi − β1h − Ti
)
, and similarly for the other units
(see below for detailed equations). Here τ = 0.01 s is the mem-
brane time constant and G = 1 is the load. Activation of a bias
unit introduces an additional recurrent feedback loop to its choice
unit, and thus the effective gain of that choice unit is dynamically
increased relative to the other choice unit. Hence, a choice unit
with external bias input can win the competition despite having a
smaller input value relative to the other choice unit (Figure 9C).
The stronger the bias input bi, the more the competition is biased
in favor of its corresponding state (Figure 9D). We assume that
their activity fluctuates slowly between trials and stems from the
positive part of a normal distribution with mean 0 and a small
standard deviation. Numerical simulations were performed using
Euler integration with  = 0.01 s in Matlab (Mathworks, Inc.),
with α, β, and δ fixed at the above values. This circuit has a high
gain but is nevertheless stable through the balance of excitation
and inhibition for a wide range of parameters (Rutishauser et al.,
2011).
Steady-state analysis of the spatial-bias circuit model
Given the neural network schematized in Figure 7, the dynamic
state equations for i = L,R are:
τx˙i + Gxi = f
(
Ii + αxi + δpi − β1h − Ti
)
, (A.1)
τh˙ + Gh = f
⎛
⎝β2
R∑
j= L
xj − Th
⎞
⎠, (A.2)
and
τp˙i + Gpi = f
(
δxi + bi − Tpi
)
(A.3)
Here bi is the constant bias input into the bias unit pi, which has
a two-way connection with its corresponding choice unit xi, for
i = L,R. Ii is the external input variable over time into xi for i =
L,R. The firing rate activation function of the units is the non-
saturating rectification nonlinearity:
f (z) = max(0, z) (A.4)
If we take G = 1 and Ti = Th = Tpi = T for i = L, R, the steady-
state value of the winning unit xw (where w is either L or R)
for constant input Iw > 0 and a constant bias bw > 0 (that is
sufficient to activate the bias unit pw) is:
xw = Iw + δ(bw − T) + T(β1 − 1)
1 − α + β1β2 − δ2 . (A.5)
Compare this to:
xw = Iw + T(β1 − 1)
1 − α + β1β2 (A.6)
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FIGURE 7 | Pairwise intersections of spatial-bias neurons, reward-bias
neurons, and choice neurons in the DLPFC. (A) The proportion of
reward-bias neurons among spatial bias neurons is not significantly
different than the proportion of reward-bias neurons among the entire
neuronal population (p = 0.98, χ2-test). (B) The proportion of choice
neurons among spatial-bias neurons is not significantly different than their
proportion among the entire neuronal population (p = 0.73, χ2-test). (C)
The proportion of choice neurons among reward-bias neurons is not
significantly greater than their proportion among the entire neuronal
population (p = 0.87, χ2-test).
[see also Equation 2.3 in Rutishauser and Douglas (2009)].
Equation A.6. is the steady state activity of the winner choice unit
in a network without a bias (i.e., when δ = 0).
Equation A.5 therefore shows that inserting the bias neurons
adds two terms to Equation A.6. One is a constant linear term
δ(b − T) multiplied by the gain, 1/ (1 − αβ1β2 − δ2
)
, (the gain
is the amount by which the choice unit, xi, amplifies its input,
Ii). The other is a modification (increase) of the gain by the sub-
traction of δ2 from its denominator. Functionally, for the choice
unit whose corresponding bias unit is active (that is for pi, i = L,
or R, where δxi + b − T > 0), the gain is higher and thus the
unit is more likely to win. A choice unit whose bias unit is not
active effectively has δ = 0 and is described by Equation A.5, thus
ending up with a reduced gain. Hence, for a fixed δ, the only non-
linearity is when the bias unit switches from inactive to active;
thereafter the network is fully linear in b (though non-linear as a
function of δ).
The full circuit-model
The full circuit model (see Figures S5E,F), encompassing both the
spatial and reward-size biases, is an extension of the reduced—
spatial-bias-only—circuit-model described in the Materials and
Methods (Figure 7). It includes six additional units on top of the
five making up the reduced circuit model. Two are the reward-
size bias units qlo and qhi, representing a bias toward the low
and high rewards, respectively. These units receive inputs clo and
clo, respectively. The other four units are devoted to the con-
version of low- and high-reward biases into motion-applicable
left or right biases after cue onset. Thus, qlo is connected dloL
and dloR and qhi is connected dhiR and dhiL, all with connection
strength δ3 = 5. Then, dloL and dhiL are bi-directionally con-
nected to xL while dhiR and dloR are bi-directionally connected
to xR, all with connection strength δ3 = 0.1. It is important
to keep the reward-size bias activity from affecting the choice
neurons until the cue signal, which pairs the high and low
rewards with left and right targets, reaches the circuit. This
pairing is achieved by turning on one of two input signals—
either vhi= L or vhi=R. Here vhi= L inputs into dhiL and dloR
while vhi=R inputs into dloL and dhiR. This is also achieve by
keeping the activation threshold of the 4 d units a higher than
the rest of the units, at Td = 8. This structure enables the
reward-size bias to counter and even later overturn the effects
of the spatial bias and the inputs on the choice units (see
Figure S5F).
RESULTS
PREFRONTAL AND STRIATAL ACTIVITY RELATED TO BIASES IN
DECISION MAKING
The choices of animals that were free to select between a delayed,
larger reward and an immediate, smaller reward (Figure 1A) indi-
cated that they increasingly discounted the value of a reward with
longer delay (Kim et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2009) (Figure 1B,
Figure S1). Our goal was to study the extent to which the spiking
activity of DLPFC, VS, and CD neurons before cue onset predicts
the subsequent decision of the animal to select one or the other
alternative and how that activity was integrated with the post-cue
choice activity. Hence, we tested for correlation and not causation.
We hypothesized that such pre-cue bias activity was dissociated
from the post-cue choice activity, but that the two would be com-
bined to make a decision at the go signal. Yet, this bias activity
would have a weaker influence on the ultimate decision than the
choice activity. So the bias activity would mainly have an effect
when the values of the decision alternatives were similar.
We therefore divided all trials into four types according to the
similarity of the discounted values of the targets, which is to say
how much the animal’s decision was determined by the stimulus.
Trials with most similar target values, and thus relatively unde-
termined by the reward/delay stimulus, were designated UNDET
(see Materials and Methods and Figures 1B, S1). Trials with
somewhat similar target values were designated WDET. And tri-
als with more divergent target values were designated SDET. Last,
control trials, where the animals were instructed what target to
select, were designated no-choice trials (NC; see Materials and
Methods for details). For neurons coding a bias, the pre-cue activ-
ity level (spiking rate) should thus maximally influence decisions
between eventual leftward- vs. rightward-movement (or smaller
vs. larger reward) in UNDET trials, and that influence should
progressively decrease for WDET and then SDET and NC trials.
We investigated two types of bias. The first is a spatial bias,
favoring either the target on the left or on the right. The sec-
ond is a reward-bias, favoring the target with the smaller or larger
reward. For each neuron, we calculated the accuracy (proportion
of trials with correctly predicted decisions from overall trials) over
the four trial types using logistic-regression in a leave-one-out
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cross-validation scheme (see Materials and Methods; Figures 2–4
show raster plots, spike-density functions and the best-fit logis-
tic regression for DLPFC spatial bias, DLPFC reward bias, and
VS spatial bias, respectively). As we were interested in bias activ-
ity, we focused on the 1.5 s before cue onset. Using bootstrapping,
we then computed the chance level for each neuron, from which
we could compute the proportion of the variance that the neu-
ron’s activity explained above chance level for every trial type
(hereafter, proportion explained; see Materials and Methods). We
describe the results from 105DLPFC neurons, 52VS neurons, and
54 CD neurons for spatial-bias calculations. For the reward-bias
analysis we included 13, 4, and 6 additional DLPFC, VS, and CD
neurons that met the analysis criteria, respectively (see Materials
and Methods).
We expected the pre-cue firing rate of bias neurons (henceforth
bias activity) to be most predictive of the decision during UNDET
trials. The accuracy in UNDET trials for spatial bias was signif-
icantly greater than chance for 29 DLPFC neurons (28%) and
14VS neurons (27%), while 12 DLPFC neurons (10%) showed
significant reward bias (at p = 0.05, see Materials and Methods;
Figures 5, 6, Table S1). These were designatedDLPFC spatial-bias
neurons, VS spatial-bias neurons, and DLPFC reward-bias neu-
rons, respectively. These numbers of bias neurons are significantly
larger than expected by chance (p = 3 · 10−14, p = 2 · 10−7, and
p = 0.015, binomial test, respectively; Figures 5A–C). As a con-
trol, we ran the same bias-neurons search procedure for SDET
trials, where the stimulus should be the overwhelming influence
on the decision. We therefore did not expect to be able to extract
a significant number of bias neurons there. Indeed, we found
only 8 DLPFC spatial-bias neurons and 3VS spatial-bias neurons,
which is within what would be expected by chance (p = 0.16 and
p = 0.49, binomial test, respectively).
To make sure that our results are not due to our selection
criteria for bias neurons, we also examined the entire neuronal
populations for spatial and reward biases in the DLPFC and for
spatial bias in the VS. We calculated the percentile of the predic-
tion accuracy of each neuron in the population in its chance-level
distribution (see Materials and Methods). And we found that
the mean of the percentiles for the 105 neurons that took part
in DLPFC spatial-bias calculations, the 118 neurons that partic-
ipated in DLPFC reward-bias calculations, and the 52 neurons
that were involved in VS spatial-bias calculations was 66, 57, and
63%, respectively; all significantly greater than the correspond-
ing chance-distribution means (p = 2 · 10−7, p = 0.01, and p =
0.004, respectively; Wilcoxon tests; Figure 6). The numbers of
neurons in each population in the top 50-percentile—69 of 105
for DLPFC spatial-bias analysis, 70 of 118 for DLPFC reward-bias
analysis, and 33 of 52 for VS spatial-bias analysis—were also sig-
nificantly above chance for all three populations (p = 8 · 10−4,
p = 0.026, and p = 0.035, respectively; binomial tests; Figure 6).
In addition, we expected a progressive decrease in the predic-
tive power of the bias activity as the difference in the temporally
discounted values of the two targets increased. We therefore cal-
culated the predictive power of the bias neurons also over WDET,
SDET, and NC trials. And we found the expected decrease in our
data from UNDET trials, through WDET, to SDET and NC tri-
als (Figures 5D–F). We conclude that the neural activity of the
29 DLPFC and 14VS spatial-bias neurons as well as 12 DLPFC
reward-bias neurons predicted the upcoming choice of move-
ment direction or reward size before any information about the
reward-delay combination of the alternatives became available to
the animal.
We also analyzed the data in search of choice neurons. Using a
regression model that included the temporally discounted values
of both targets, we discovered that 17 of the 105 DLPFC neurons
(16%; p = 2 · 10−5, binomial test) and 12 of the 54 CD neurons
(22%; p = 1 · 10−5, binomial test) had significantly altered activ-
ity during the cue period (Figure 1A) according to the animal’s
choice of target (Table S1) (Kim et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2011).
We refer to them as choice neurons. It was of interest to inves-
tigate to what extent spatial-bias neurons were also reward-bias
neurons and choice neurons, and vice versa. In the DLPFC, the
intersection of spatial- and reward-bias neurons with the choice
neurons was not significantly larger than would be expected by
chance when these effects were combined independently (p =
0.73 and p = 0.87, respectively, χ2-test; Figures 7B,C), indicat-
ing that choice neurons were not preferentially also bias neurons
of either kind. Moreover, we found no evidence for anatomical
clustering of spatial or reward-bias neurons or of choice neu-
rons in the DLPFC of the two animals (Figure 8A). Unlike the
DLPFC, in the striatum we found that only VS contained a sig-
nificant number of spatial-bias neurons, and the proportion of
spatial bias neurons was significantly higher in VS than in CD
(Figure 8B, Table S1). In addition, only the CD contained a sig-
nificant number of choice neurons, and the proportion of such
neurons was again significantly greater than that of these neu-
rons in VS. Neither VS nor CD contained a significant number
of reward-bias neurons (Figure 8B, Table S1).
False-negatives analysis
We used logistic-regression in a leave-one-out cross-validation
procedure to keep the false-positives rate for discovering bias neu-
rons low. This comes at the expense of an increased probability
of mistakenly rejecting neurons that are actually bias neurons,
thus increasing the false-negative rate. We therefore developed a
method to estimate a lower bound on this false-negatives rate.
Given our recording procedure, we generally have acces to only
a single neuron at a time, and always to only one bias neuron
at a time. And in our limited sample of trials, activity patterns
of a true bias neuron might, due to noise for example, not coin-
cide with that of the overall bias population that—according to
our model—determines the decision of the monkey. To assess
this false-negatives rate, we calculated the preferred and non-
preferred reward size and the number of trials associated with
each DLPFC reward-bias neuron. Taking the mean firing rate
and number of trials for the preferred and non-preferred reward
sizes, we ran a simulation, sampling from a Poisson process with
these firing rates and number of trials over a 1.5 s duration (the
duration of our pre-cue period). We ran our bias-neurons identi-
fication procedure on the simulated results to test whether such a
simulated reward-bias neuron would be identified by our proce-
dure.We ran this bootstrapping procedure 1000 times, and for the
DLPFC reward-bias neurons found that in only 70% of these runs
the simulated neuron was identified as a bias neuron. Therefore,
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FIGURE 8 | Locations of neurons recorded in DLPFC and striatum.
(A) Anatomical locations of the DLPC neurons. Distance from the
cortical surface is not shown in this planar plot. Hence neurons that
differ only in their depth appear on top of each other, as do neurons
that belong to more than one group. No evidence was found for
anatomical clustering of the various neural groups (1-way MANOVA
p > 0.15 for all groups). (B) A coronal view of neuron locations in
ventral striatum (VS; black marker edges) and caudate nucleus (CD;
no marker edges). Dotted lines designate the border between CD,
putamen, and VS.
our population of 118 neurons involved in reward-bias analysis
may in fact contain 12/0.7 ≈ 17 reward-bias neurons instead of
only 12 bias neurons.
Importantly, other factors that are harder to simulate may
increase the false-negatives rate: The recorded neuron might
belong to, say, the high-reward bias population and we may hap-
pen to record a majority of trials where the monkey opted for
the low reward in our limited sample. Alternatively, interactions
between reward-bias neurons and spatial-bias neurons may can-
cel each other out, especially in a limited sample (Figure S3B).
Therefore, the 70% of trials where a simulated reward-bias neu-
ron was correctly identified should be viewed as an upper bound
on the false-negatives rate inherent in our procedure, and it is
possible that there are more than 17 reward-bias neurons in the
recorded neuronal population.
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF THE BIAS ACTIVITY
Our analysis suggests that a significant number of DLPFC and VS
neurons show single-trial pre-cue biases. We tested and excluded
several possible sources of this bias activity. If the animal’s cur-
rent choice, especially for UNDET trials, is significantly correlated
with its choice in the preceding trials, the pre-cue biases might
be a reflection of persistent activity associated with the choice
in the previous trial or of behavioral choice patterns across tri-
als. But we found no evidence for correlations between choices in
UNDET and preceding trials, nor between choices when exam-
ining only UNDET trials (as far as 10 trials back; Supplemental
Text, Figure S4). In addition, we often found left/right and small-
/large-reward differences in the bias activity throughout the 1.5 s
pre-cue period (see examples in Figures 2–4). Had the bias activ-
ity reflected lingering neuronal activity from the previous trial, we
would have expected to find these differences mainly in the begin-
ning of the pre-cue period. This also suggests that it is not only
bias activity close to cue onset that affects the animal’s eventual
decision.
For each neuron we also calculated whether its firing rate
tended to be higher for all trials culminating in leftward (or
rightward) saccades for spatial-bias neurons or in saccades toward
the smaller (or larger) reward for reward-bias analysis, during
the pre-cue epoch. We found that 17 of the 29 DLPFC spatial-
bias neurons and 9 of the 14VS spatial-bias neurons were more
active toward the left, and that 7 of the 12 reward-bias neu-
rons were more active toward the small reward; none of these
are significantly different from an even split (p = 0.23, p = 0.21,
and p = 0.39, binomial test, respectively). We therefore found no
evidence that bias neurons had a preferential preferred direction.
Lastly, in the DLPFC, 8 (9) of the 11 (18) bias neurons that
were recorded from the left (right) hemisphere—i.e., recorded
from animal D (J) (see Figure 6A)—had higher firing rate toward
the left (right), across all trials in the pre-cue epoch. There was
therefore no significant correlation between the hemispheric lat-
erality and the target toward which the neuron was more active
(p = 0.34 and p = 0.29, χ2-test of 8/11 vs. 17/29 and of 9/18
vs. 11/29, respectively). So we could not find evidence for cor-
relation between the brain hemisphere from which the DLPFC
neurons were recorded and their preferred direction. All VS
neurons were recorded from the right hemisphere (Figure 6B).
Following this and the even split for left/right preferred directions
reported above, our data shows no spatial preference in terms of
the recorded brain hemisphere and the behaviorally chosen side.
PREDICTIONS FROM A CIRCUIT MODEL
To better understand the nature of this pre-cue bias activity,
we developed a plausible neural circuit model of a biased WTA
network (Figure 9A, Materials and Methods). Unlike a simple
WTA circuit where the identity of the winner depends only on
the inputs (Figure 9B), in our model the activity of a diver-
gent population of bias units also influences the winner selection
(Figures 9C,D). Hereafter we refer to the elements of the cir-
cuit model as units and to actual DLPFC or BG cells as neurons;
each unit represents a population of neurons. The model had
two versions—one that focused on the spatial bias activity alone
(Figure 9) and another, expanded version encompassing both
spatial and reward biases (Figures S3A,B). The model does not
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FIGURE 9 | A simple biased WTA circuit model accounts for the
spatial-bias data and makes additional predictions. (A) A circuit
for spatial-bias activity. Units xL and xR designate populations of left
and right choice neurons, which are self-excitatory and mutually
inhibitory (through inhibitory neuron h). Each choice unit is
bi-directionally connected to a bias unit (pL and pR ) Excitatory
(inhibitory) connections are designated by arrows (circles). (B) Without
bias input (bL = bR = 0), this is a simple WTA network, so for inputs
IR > IL (IR = 2 and IL = 1.8, in this case) xL’s activity diminishes to
zero and xR ’s increases and then stabilizes. (C) When the left bias
is turned on (bL = 5, bR = 0), xL now wins for the inputs in B.
Note that the bias activity was turned off (at t = 250ms) shortly
after the onset of the competition (at t = 200ms). (D) A phase-space
diagram simulating various values for bL and IL − IR when bR = 0
and IR = 2. The separatrix between the basin of attraction of xL
winning and xR winning is constant until approximately 1, when bL
passes its activation threshold, and then linear. (See Figure S3 for
the full model, including both spatial- and reward-bias activity.).
incorporate noise for the sake of simplicity. Nevertheless, simula-
tions we performed indicate that, even in the presence of noise,
the results remain the same on average.
A main thrust of our model is that the bias and choice units
are dissociated, as indicated by our data: We discovered that bias
neurons are not preferentially also choice neurons in DLPFC
(Figures 7B,C, 8A). And we found that, of the three types of
neurons, there are only spatial-bias neurons in significant num-
bers in VS and only choice neurons in significant numbers in
CD (Figure 8B). Our simulations also demonstrate that it is suf-
ficient for the spatial-bias units to be active at the very beginning
of the competition to influence the identity of the final winner:
After giving an initial boost to the network dynamics, the WTA
network amplifies any initial small differences. We therefore stop
the input to the model’s bias units shortly after the onset of the
inputs to the choice units (Figure 9C). Our circuit model thus
suggests that the prediction accuracy of the spatial-bias neurons
may decrease with time during the cue period. This prediction
is of interest because it relates to the manner by which the bias
and choice activities are combined after cue onset by postulating
how bias neurons would behave after cue onset, when rational
deliberation can begin.We tested this model prediction by further
analysis of our experimental data during the cue period and the
first second after the go signal, and found it to be true. For DLPFC
spatial-bias neurons, there was no significant decrease in the pro-
portion explained between the pre-cue period and go period,
while the proportion explained during the cue-period decreased
to chance level (Figure 10A). For VS spatial-bias neurons, the
proportion explained decreased to chance level during both the
cue and go periods (Figure 10C). We think that this might be
because DLPFC spatial-bias neurons may be more involved in the
motor aspects of the task than VS spatial-bias neurons.
For reward biases, in contrast, the mapping between the high
and low rewards and the left and right targets is only revealed by
the stimulus. So, reward-biases can be translated into spatial coor-
dinates only after stimulus onset (see full model, Figure S3A). To
influence the decision effectively, the reward-bias thus needs to
remain active longer than the spatial bias (Figure S3B). The neural
data we gathered also reflects this; the DLPFC reward-bias neu-
rons are the only ones remaining predictive during the cue-period
(compare Figure 10B and Figures 10A,C).
“Error-trials” analysis
In value-based decisions, it is generally not possible to know
with certainty whether the chosen target was associated with the
subject’s larger discounted value or not. Except in some special
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FIGURE 10 | The predictive power of spatial and reward DLPFC bias
neurons and VS spatial-bias neurons during the pre-cue, cue and go
periods. The average (±SEM) proportion explained above chance level and
the average (±SEM) activity levels are depicted for the pre-cue, cue and go
period for all 29 DLPFC spatial-bias neurons (in the left and right panels of
A, respectively), for all 12 DLPFC reward-bias neurons (in the left and right
panels of B, respectively), and for all 14 VS spatial-bias neurons (in the left
and right panels of C, respectively). P-values in the figure are for one-tailed
t-tests. (A) The proportion of accuracy explained in the pre-cue and go
periods are not significantly different (one-tailed t-test p = 0.2), but are
significantly larger than in the cue period, where the proportion drops to
chance-level (one-tailed paired t-test p = 0.25). In contrast, the activity of
the neurons in the go period is significantly weaker than in the pre-cue
period. (B) The proportion explained for the pre-cue and cue periods are not
significantly different (one-tailed t-test p = 0.5), but a significant decrease
occurs for the go period, which is at chance level (one-tailed t-test p = 0.2).
There is no significant trend in the activity levels among the pre-cue, cue,
and go periods (one-way ANOVA p = 0.64). Note that the proportion
explained for the DLPFC reward-bias pre-cue period is also significantly
higher than the pre-cue proportion explained in DLPFC spatial bias (in A,
one-tailed t-test p = 6·10−4). (C) The proportion explained drops
significantly after the pre-cue period to chance level (one-tailed paired t-test
p = 0.8 and p = 0.6 for the cue and go periods, respectively). Again there is
no significant trend in the activity levels across the pre-cue, cue, and go
periods (one-way ANOVA p = 0.3).
circumstances (see below), it is thus not possible to declare a
choice correct or incorrect. However, when both the small and
large rewards are offered with no delay (an SDET trial), ani-
mals maximizing the temporally discounted value of reward
(Figure 1B) should always select the larger immediate reward
(which they did for 97% of 1536 and 99% of 1698 of such DLPFC
and striatal trials, respectively). Following the model prediction
above, immediate reward trials where the animal nevertheless
chose the small reward—hereafter error trials—should be asso-
ciated with especially strong bias activity, and hence with higher
firing rate of the bias neurons. Consistent with this prediction,
the mean (±SEM) standardized firing rate (see Materials and
Methods) over all the DLPFC spatial-bias neurons whose pre-
ferred direction aligned with the target associated with the smaller
discounted value during error trials was 0.68 ± 0.44, which was
significantly higher than their standardized firing rate during the
rest of the trials, at 0 ± 0.03 (one-tailed t-test p = 0.008; the value
of 0 for the mean firing rate results from the standardization pro-
cedure, see Materials and Methods). The error trials above were
distributed throughout the experimental sessions, suggesting that
the animal’s motivation level and alertness did not factor into the
firing rate difference. The striatum data contained too few error
trials for similar statistical analysis.
DISCUSSION
We examined single-neuron activity from the DLPFC, VS, and
CD of monkeys that freely choose between a delayed, larger
reward and amore-immediate, smaller one. Our working hypoth-
esis was that such activity before the cue revealed the decision
alternatives—and thus before rational deliberation could begin—
had some influence on the ultimate choice of the animals. We
speculated that such bias activity was dissociated from the post-
cue choice activity, and had a weaker influence on the decision
than that choice activity. So, when it was later integrated with
the choice activity, the effect of the bias activity would be mainly
apparent where the reward/delay combinations would have simi-
lar values for the animal (i.e., in UNDET trials, in our case).
We found that when the animals were confronted with two
targets with similar temporally discounted values for the rewards
associated with the targets, more than a quarter of the analyzed
neurons in DLPFC and in VS signaled the direction of the even-
tual eye movement before cue onset. In addition, 1 in 10 DLPFC
neurons coded the eventual choice of the animal between a larger
or smaller reward—or equivalently, between the red and green
targets, respectively—before cue onset. In such trials, a choice
between the large and small reward usually also translated into
a choice between the short and long delay, respectively. Moreover,
we found significant numbers of both types of bias neurons as
well as of choice neurons in the DLPFC; both types of bias
neurons were not preferentially also choice neurons, nor were
spatial-bias neurons preferentially also reward-bias neurons, and
vice versa. Yet, we found only spatial-bias neurons in signifi-
cant numbers in the VS and only choice neurons in significant
numbers in the CD. The spatial- and reward-bias activities were
found, on average, over the entire DLPFC neuronal population,
as was the spatial-bias activity found on average over the entire
VS population. This suggests that the presence of bias neurons
was not merely an artifact of our selection criteria. Our results are
therefore compatible with our hypothesis.
We considered the implications of the presence of bias neurons
for decision-making using a computational approach. In our task,
we viewed decision making as a competition between the two
choices represented by the targets. And this choice activity exerted
a stronger influence on the results than the bias activity. The
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function of the bias neurons was to more-weakly favor one of the
alternatives, thus making that choice more likely, especially when
the choice activity only marginally swayed the competition.While
there are different approaches and levels of abstraction to mod-
eling such decision-making, almost all regard making a decision
as a competition. Drift-diffusion and race-to-threshold models
(Smith and Ratcliff, 2004) have been used extensively and account
for data acquired in perceptual discrimination tasks (Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001; Mazurek et al., 2003; Palmer et al., 2005;
Heekeren et al., 2008) as well as value-based decisions (Basten
et al., 2010; Krajbich et al., 2010). However, their abstract mathe-
matical nature does not easily lend itself to exploration of circuit
mechanisms. In particular, it is not clear how to represent choice
and bias neurons as dissociated populations (Figure 9A, Figure
S3A) in these more abstract models. In contrast, biophysically
based cortical microcircuit models for decision-making based
on attractor dynamics explain decision-making data well (Wang,
2002; Wong and Wang, 2006), while suggesting mechanisms for
the instantiation of these decisions in neural substrate (Rolls and
Deco, 2011). We thus focused our modeling efforts on circuits
implementing competition using shared inhibition between two
pools of competing excitatory units. In this framework, bias neu-
rons can be included naturally as additional units that bias the
competition between different pools.
We derived several empirically testable predictions from our
model, which we in turn tested in the data. First, the model sug-
gested that spatial-bias, reward-bias, and choice neurons might
be pairwise-divergent populations. We found that this was the
case in the striatum, with the VS and CD containing only spatial-
bias and choice neurons in significant numbers, respectively
(Figure 8B). In the DLPFC we found that choice neurons are not
preferentially also either type of bias neurons, nor are spatial-
bias neurons preferentially reward-bias neurons, and vice versa
(Figure 7). Moreover, we found different activity patterns for
DLPFC spatial-bias, reward-bias and choice neurons across the
pre-cue and cue periods (Figure 10). In that vain, the model also
suggested that while spatial-biasing activity is required only in the
beginning of the competition, the reward-biases would remain on
longer after cue onset (Figure S3B). Also inline with our model’s
predictions, in “error” trials (where the animals chose a small
immediate reward over a large immediate one) the firing rate of
the bias neurons, whose preferred direction aligned with the tar-
get associated with the smaller temporally discounted choice, was
higher than in other trials. However, as only a small number of
neurons and trials were involved in this analysis, this result can
only be taken as preliminary evidence that bias activity may occa-
sionally also affect the monkey’s decision when the values of the
two decision options are substantially different.
In other tasks, when the most rewarding choice could be cal-
culated before cue onset, predictive pre-cue neural activity was
found in CD choice neurons (Coe et al., 2002; Lauwereyns et al.,
2002; Ding and Hikosaka, 2006). In contrast, in our task where
the most rewarding choice could only be deliberated upon after
cue onset (due to the random shuffling of the reward size and
delay among trials), we found only post-cue CD choice activity.
Combined, these data are therefore consistent with the hypoth-
esis that deliberation about an upcoming choice, be it before or
after cue onset, involves choice neurons (in DLPFC and CD, in
our case), while pre-deliberation bias activity involves bias neu-
rons (spatial ones in DLPFC and VS and reward ones in DLPFC
alone).
Other studies utilized a perceptual judgment task (random-
dot motion discrimination) to study choice activity. In that task,
pre-deliberation spatial-bias activity was found in monkey LIP
(Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Williams et al., 2003) and CD
(Ding and Gold, 2010), but not in DLPFC (Kim and Shadlen,
1999). There are three important differences between those find-
ings and ours. First, while in perceptual judgments the reward is
usually contingent upon the correct response to the perceptual
cue, for value-based decisions there are seldom correct and incor-
rect answers and the animal is free to choose its reward. Second,
previous studies reported spatial biases whereas we also found
non-spatial biases that reflect preferences for reward size and are
dissociated from spatial bias activity. Third, these studies focused
on pre-cue bias activity in choice neurons, while we searched
for bias activity in the entire neural population, and found bias
activity that was dissociated from choice activity in DLPFC, and
with anatomical specificity for bias and choice neurons in the
striatum. We need not commit to a strict distinction between
perceptual and value-based decisions, but the above may explain
why we found DLPFC bias activity when previous studies did not
and why we found only choice activity in CD and others found
pre-cue spatial-bias activity in a small fraction of choice neu-
rons there (Ding and Gold, 2010). Also, whereas a fluctuating bias
may reduce the reward in a perceptual decision task, it may well
be part of the subjective aspect of value-based decisions (Gold
and Shadlen, 2007). Last, our animals might have used delib-
erative goal-directed judgments to accomplish their task, while
subjects making perceptual decisions relied on intuitive-habitual
judgments, which may involve different brain systems (Daw et al.,
2005; Rangel et al., 2008).
The bias activity we recorded does not seem to be related to
past behavioral patterns, nor does it have preferential preferred
direction or hemispheric specificity. This is in contrast to neural
activity in forced-choice memory tasks, where striatal neurons,
but not DLPFC neurons, exhibit strong contralateral spatial pref-
erence (Kawagoe et al., 1998; Kobayashi et al., 2007). Moreover,
the structure of our task, together with the random shuffling
of the reward size and delay across trials, left no beneficial role
for anticipation (Lauwereyns, 2010). Nor is it likely that visual
attention played a role in bias formation, because during the pre-
cue period the screen was empty but for a small central fixation
target. But, as we found that DLPFC spatial-bias neurons were
similarly predictive during the pre-cue and go period, yet not
predictive during the cue period (Figure 10A), this DLPFC bias
activity may include a motor component. Going back to the ques-
tion with which we started, it seems that in our experimental
setting, the bias activity is unlikely to be decision related, as it is
recorded before the decision alternatives are presented and ratio-
nal deliberation can begin. It may be related to top-down atten-
tion (Hopfinger et al., 2000; Changizi and Shimojo, 2008), or to
other factors not immediately related to the neural mechanisms of
decision making. In particular, the single-trial pre-cue bias activ-
ity we found may be related to slowly fluctuating spontaneous
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brain activity (Fox et al., 2007) thought to be involved in respond-
ing to stimuli in conjunction with stimulus-evoked activity (Arieli
et al., 1996; Wang, 2002; Leopold et al., 2003; Ress and Heeger,
2003; Fox et al., 2006; Vincent et al., 2006). If the bias activ-
ity is dependent on such fluctuations, it could explain why the
bias and choice neurons may be distinct populations: the bias
neurons may belong to a network of spontaneous activity, dis-
tinct from the decision network. A recent model of the neural
substrates underlying unmotivated free-choices suggests that the
onset of such choices depends on spontaneous fluctuations in
neuronal activity (Schurger et al., 2012). So, assuming that the
bias-neuronal activity we found is based on spontaneous fluctu-
ations, might suggest that another aspect of free actions—action
selection—also relies on these fluctuations. Neural fluctuations
as the basis of our results are also congruent with the finding
that inhibiting DLPFC activity in humans using transcranial mag-
netic stimulation reduces their ability to generate random motor
sequences (Jahanshahi and Dirnberger, 1999). Moreover, it is
inline with the proposed role of the BG and frontal cortex in
biasing competitions among neural activations, which originate
from sensory information and result in action (Cisek and Kalaska,
2010). Perhaps while the VS holds predeliberation biases, the CD
informs the decisions, as they are made, through choice neurons.
As for testing the predeliberation-biases hypothesis, do
decisions—especially indeliberate ones, between similarly valued
options—also rely on predeliberation activity to bias the choice
toward one of the alternatives? Our results appear consistent with
that hypothesis. And, as the model demonstrates, even weak bias
activity can end up greatly influencing the identity of the selected
decision alternative. What is more, our results suggest that these
bias brain-signals may not be part of a decision process that is
normally involved in rational deliberation, because they happen
before the decision alternatives are revealed and rational delib-
eration can begin. Instead, the bias signals we measured may
depend on a dissociated predeliberation network. Raising the left
or right hand for no reason or purpose and with little conse-
quence (Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al.,
2008, 2013; Bode et al., 2011; Fried et al., 2011) is the epitome
of such random, indeliberate decisions. So the weak-to-moderate
prediction ability well before movement onset that is exhibited
in these experiments (60–70% accuracy) might rely on such fluc-
tuating bias activity rather than be part of the decision network
normally involved in rational deliberation. It is therefore of inter-
est that some recent attempts to model indeliberate decisions
focus on the DLPFC as the locus of intentional action selection
(Pockett, 2006; Pacherie and Haggard, 2011). Further research is
required to shed more light on the origins of this early prediction
ability.
But similarly valued decision options are not restricted only to
such random choices. Arguably, some of the biggest and toughest
decisions in life—such as selecting a partner or career path—
are difficult also because the decision alternatives are associated
with similar values (e.g., is a job that is better paying but less
interesting and more demanding than the current one prefer-
able?). Our results—to the extent they can be generalized to such
situations—suggest that these decisions may well end up being
considerably influenced by neural biases that are not part of the
rational decision process and start before rational deliberation
can even begin.
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